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Abstract. This paper considers the aggregate profitability performance of the REIT industry. The aggregate performance 
depends on the underlying microeconomic dynamics within an industry – the growth of individual REITs (the within ef-
fect), the reallocation between existing REITs (the between effect), the entry of new REITs (the entry effect), and the exit 
of the existing REITs (the exit effect). We apply an extended Bennet (1920) dynamic decomposition on the REIT industry’s 
return on equity (ROE) and study the annual data on U.S. Equity REITs for the 1989 to 2015 period and various REIT 
industry specific sub-sample periods. Bailey et al.’s (1992) and Haltiwanger’s (1997) dynamic industry performance decom-
positions are special cases of the Bennet decomposition. The “within” and “between” effects dominate the annual changes 
in this industry’s ROE. To the extent that our Equity REIT sample proxies for the FTSE NAREIT All Equity Index, our 
conclusions also relate to this index’s profitability performance between 1989 and 2015.
Keywords: aggregate fluctuations, dynamic decomposition, ROE changes.
Intruduction
The U.S. Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) industry 
provides fertile ground for cultivating research on industry 
dynamics. The industry has experienced immense growth, 
expansion, and some consolidation, especially since ac-
complishing its first-ever listing on the S&P500 Index in 
October 2001 and weathering the Global Financial Cri-
sis (GFC) of 2007–2008. An examination of the National 
Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT) 
(2020a) webpage yields the following observations: (1) At 
the end of 1971, only 34 REITs existed, of which 12 were 
Equity REITs, 12 were Mortgage REITs, and the remaining 
10 were Hybrid REITs, with market capitalizations in the 
neighborhood of $332, $571, and $592 million, respec-
tively; (2) At the end of 2019, 219 REITs existed, of which 
179 were Equity REITs and 40 were Mortgage REITs, with 
market capitalizations in the neighborhood of $1,246 tril-
lion and $83 billion, respectively (https://www.reit.com/
data-research/reit-market-data/us-reit-industry-equity-
market-cap). The historical development of U.S. institu-
tions, with a strong aversion to concentration of power 
and with significant regulation in the REIT sector1 since 
the early 1960s, has generated a competitive, highly suc-
cessful, transparent, and innovative industry that has sig-
nificantly surpassed its counterparts elsewhere. In fact, the 
U.S. model and experience have proved the main motiva-
tion for the formal development of the REIT industry in 
several countries, including Australia, Japan, France, and 
the United Kingdom since the early 2000s.
In this paper, we study empirically the evolution of the 
annual changes in the aggregated profitability of the REIT 
industry by employing the Bennet (1920) decomposition 
method. High capital intensity characterizes the REIT 
industry, which has been operating under regulation to 
transform illiquid income-producing real estate assets into 
liquid and tradeable assets. Further, REITs must main-
tain or enjoy prompt access to substantial cash reserves 
to meet, at a minimum, the legally mandated periodic 
dividend payout ratio. Institutional investors, including 
1 Legislation has offered tax-exemption if REITs fulfill legally 
specified dividend payment and other requirements.
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pension funds, have increased their ownership of REITs 
and used periodic and relatively predictable cash inflows 
from REITs to meet their cash outflow needs. So, the pub-
lic must maintain its confidence in the soundness of the 
REIT industry.
The pattern of REIT entries, mergers, and exits has 
generated dynamic fluctuations in both the number and 
size of REIT organizations, affecting differentially the 
REIT industry’s profitability and concentration across 
time. So, after adopting Bennet’s (1920) approach, we de-
compose dynamically the REIT industry’s annual “changes 
in ROE” into factors attributable to improved profitability 
of individual REITs (“within” effect), shifts of resources 
from less to more profitable REITs (“between” effect), en-
tries of more profitable REITs (“entry” effect), and exits of 
less profitable REITs (“exit and conversion” effect) between 
1989 and 2015.2 We focus mainly on the evolution of the 
“within” and “between” effects since those that enter the 
industry join shortly the ranks of survivors and those that 
exit present severe post-exit data challenges.
We measure the annual profitability of the REIT in-
dustry by the aggregated industry return on equity (ROE). 
The National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts 
(NAREIT) has championed the use of the Funds From 
Operations (FFO) metric since the 1990s so as to provide 
a more informative measurement of REITs’ operating per-
formance. According to NAREIT (2020b), FFO equals “a 
REIT’s net income, excluding gains or losses from sales 
of property, and adding back real estate depreciation” 
(https://www.reit.com/what-reit/glossary-reit-terms). 
FFO-based results may also prove consistent with REITs’ 
expertise in managing their tax affairs.3 Further, the extant 
literature reports evidence that the FFO metric provides 
more information than the Net Income (NI) metric (Bh-
attacharya et al., 2003; Lougee & Marquardt, 2004; Ben-
Shahar et al., 2011). So, we use the FFO metric in defining 
the aggregated industry ROE.
Some other industry performance decomposition 
measures (Bailey et al., 1992; Haltiwanger, 1997) are in fact 
special cases of the Bennet decomposition. The dynamic 
decomposition of industry performance requires micro-
level information on firms – REITs in our paper – within 
an industry. The availability of micro-level (i.e., establish-
2 Note that the reverse effect could occur. That is, we could see 
worsened profitability of individual REITs (“within” effect), 
shifts of resources from more to less profitable REITs (“between” 
effect), entries of less profitable REITs (“entry” effect), and exits 
of more profitable REITs (“exit and conversion” effect).
3 Prescott and Visscher (1980) recognize organization(al) capital 
(OC) and define it as the accumulation and use of private in-
formation to enhance the production efficiency within a firm. 
OC refers to an organization’s intellectual capital, an intangible 
asset that produces significant value. REITs, as creatures of tax 
exemptions, should possess unique OC in managing their cash 
flows through their expertise in tax matters, including depre-
ciation allowances. See Devos et al. (2018) for evidence from 
a sample of REITs.
ment-level) data for manufacturing industries spawned a 
series of such applied microeconomic research.4 That re-
search effort reveals more heterogeneity among firms and 
plants within the same industry than between industries. 
In sum, aggregate industry data contain important firm- 
and plant-level dynamics that collectively determine over-
all industry dynamics.
The U.S. REIT industry has evolved over time and ex-
perienced different episodes of development and growth, 
now known as the Vintage Era (1960–1990 or 1991), the 
New REIT Era (1991 or 1992–2001), and, following Cakici 
et al. (2014), the REIT Maturity Era (2002-present time). 
The REIT Maturity Era has its beginning in the first-ever 
listing of a REIT in the S&P500 Index in October 2001 and 
covers the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The beginning of 
this era represents an endogenous accomplishment of the 
industry while the previous two depend fundamentally on 
regulators’ tax law interventions. Panel A of Figure 1 illus-
trates considerable fluctuations in the annual total num-
ber of REITs and the corresponding market capitalizations 
between 1971 and 2017. The Vintage Era includes fewer 
Equity REITs with small equity market capitalization. The 
New REIT Era captures a quick increase in the number of 
Equity REITs, which then tends to stabilize around 150 in-
stitutions, and exhibits modest growth in capitalization. The 
REIT Maturity Era witnesses reasonably constant numbers 
of Equity REITs and rapid growth in their capitalization. 
The number of Equity REITs as well as their capitaliza-
tion fell dramatically before the GFC of 2008–2009. Panel 
B of Figure 1 shows the annual total and price returns on 
REITs and reveals that total returns reflect mainly the price 
returns. Also, falling total or price returns frequently sig-
nals a recession. The fall in these returns before the GFC 
was just over 70 percentage points. Data obstacles on FFO 
restrict our sample period to 1989–2015, which covers the 
latter two eras and allows for a comparative examination of 
the differences on our research questions across the REIT-
industry specific time periods.
Our work sheds light on a number of questions on 
the profitability of (1) the overall REIT industry and (2) 
following after Chen et  al. (2012), the More- and Less-
transparent segments of the industry.5 To the extent that 
4 McGuckin (1995) describes the Longitudinal Research Da-
tabase (LRD) at the U.S. Bureau of the Census upon which 
this research relies. For banking data at the individual bank 
level, see the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (2020), https://
www.chicagofed.org/banking/financial-institution-reports/
commFercial-bank-data.
5 Equity REIT sub-samples of Apartments, Industrials, Offices, 
Regional Malls and Shopping Centers (all remaining Equity 
REIT sub-samples) are components of the More-transparent 
(Less-transparent) sub-sample, respectively. We also note that 
studying the incremental information content of the FFO met-
ric is beyond the scope of our paper. Yet, unreported NI-based 
results differ considerably from their FFO-based counterparts, 
offering preliminary evidence of the difference in information-
al content of the FFO metric even at the industry level.


















U.S. Recession Era Total Return (%) Price Return (%)
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Panel A: Annual number and annual total market value of REITs as covered in the  
FTSE-NAREIT All REIT Index
Panel B: Annual total and price returns on the FTSE-NAREIT All Equity REIT Index
Note: This graph illustrates the evolution of the REIT industry in (1) the number of all and Equity REITs, (2) their market 
valuations, and (3) their return metrics. Data for these graphs are from the National Association of Real Estate Trusts 
(2020c), https://www.reit.com.
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try’s economic efficiency might have occurred. Our results 
offer inferential and preliminary evidence to fill some of 
the gap and highlight the need for more research and re-
newed interest in this area.
This paper unfolds as follows. Section 1 discusses the 
traditional dynamic decomposition, derives an alternative 
dynamic decomposition that, when combined with the 
first decomposition, yields the Bennet dynamic decompo-
sition and puts forth our hypotheses. Section 2 discusses 
the data and sample. Section 3 provides empirical results. 
Last section concludes the paper.
1. Alternative dynamic decompositions6
1.1. Details of decomposition methodology
Bailey et al. (1992) provide an algebraic decomposition of 
an industry’s total factor productivity (TFP) growth into 
three effects – “within,” “between,” and “net-entry” (entry 
minus exit) effects. The “within” effect measures the con-
tribution of surviving firms toward TFP growth. The “be-
tween (or reallocation)” effect measures the contribution 
of changing market share of surviving firms toward TFP 
growth, while the “net-entry” effect measures the con-
tribution of firms’ entry into and exit from the industry 
toward TFP growth. Extending Bailey et al. (1992), Halti-
wanger (1997) separates the effects of firm entrants into 
and exit from the industry. Moreover, he also divides the 
“between” effect into two components – the “share” and 
“covariance” effects. The “share” effect measures the con-
tribution toward aggregate TFP growth of the changing 
share of firms while the “covariance” effect measures the 
contribution toward aggregate TFP growth of the chang-
ing share of firms times the changing TFP growth of firms. 
Stiroh (2000), using U.S. banking data, further decom-
poses Haltiwanger’s (1997) method by dividing banks into 
those that acquired other banks and those that did not.
Such decomposition methods share a common index-
number issue – the base-year choice. Bailey et al. (1992), 
Haltiwanger (1997), and Stiroh (2000) choose the initial 
year, (t–1), as the base. Thus, the “within” effect measures 
the change in TFP growth at the firm level between the 
initial (t–1) and final (t) years weighted by the initial (t–1) 
year’s market share. Alternatively, another decomposition 
possibility exists when the final (t) year provides the base. 
That is, the “within” effect weights the change in TFP 
growth between (t–1) and (t) for each firm by the firm’s 
industry share in the final (t) year. Finally, the Bennet 
(1920) decomposition combines these two dynamic de-
compositions into a simple average.7 Thus, the weighting 
6 Jeon and Miller (2005) provide details of the derivations.
7 This discussion possesses an analogy to the price index litera-
ture. The Laspeyres (1871) price index uses the initial year, the 
Paasche (1974) price index uses the final year, and the Fisher 
(1922) ideal price index forms a geometric, rather than arith-
metic, average. Pigou (1920) also proposed the ideal price index. 
Rather than considering a ratio, we focus on the change in ROE. 
our Equity REIT sample proxies for the FTSE NAREIT 
All Equity Index, our conclusions also relate to this index’s 
performance between 1989 and 2015.
First, the sum of the changes in the industry’s ROE 
over the sample period is –1.42%. The industry’s profit-
ability changes suffer massively under the duress of the 
GFC between 2007 and 2009. Removing the GFC years 
of 2007 through 2009 from the sample period boosts this 
sum to 3.82%. The same sum over the New REIT Era (be-
tween 1991 and 2001) is –1.52%. So, controlling for the 
GFC’s effects moves the industry’s cumulative profitability 
changes from the negative territory, observed in the 1990s, 
to the positive territory, observed since the first-ever list-
ing of a REIT in the S&P500 Index in October 2001.
Second, except the GFC years, the improved profitabil-
ity of individual REITs (i.e., the “within” effect) maintains 
a positive sum across all periods considered in this paper. 
Its magnitude more than doubles from the New REIT Era 
to the REIT Maturity Era. These findings are consistent 
with our expectations. What surprises us are the results 
on the shifts of resources from less to more profitable RE-
ITs (i.e., the “between” effect). Across the entire sample 
period, the main sample sub-periods, and the GFC years 
between 2007 and 2009, the sign of the sum of the annual 
“between” effects is the opposite of the sign of the sum of 
the annual “within” effects.
At least three interesting implications arise from this 
pattern. First, the positive sum of the “between” effect dur-
ing the GFC years counters partially the massively nega-
tive sum in the “within” effect. The “between” effect serves 
as an endegenous risk management apparatus during this 
unique period, which has put capitalism’s survival into an 
ongoing debate. Second, the industry appears to prefer not 
to shift resources from less to more profitable REITs so 
far. Comparisons of the results between the More- and 
Less-transparent sub-samples strengthen these conclu-
sions. Our findings may serve as a nudge to the managers 
of REITs to examine strategies on how to benefit more and 
better from the “between” effect. Finally, during normal 
times, REITs experience growth in profitability within the 
firm and the lower performing REITs do better, on aver-
age, than higher performing REITs. But, during abnormal 
times (i.e., GFC), REITs experience losses of profitability 
within the firm and higher performing REITs do better 
than lower performing REITs.
Keeping in mind the constraints of a small sample 
size on empirical tests, we note that the firm size appears 
not to influence the industry’s profitability changes. We 
are surprisingly unable to locate any recent study on the 
economic efficiency of the REIT industry. The observed 
evidence of diseconomies of scale in this industry comes 
from cost function specifications from the late 1990s or 
early 2000s (Ambrose et al., 2000, 2005; Anderson et al., 
2002; Miller et al., 2006) and is consistent with a negative 
sum in the annual changes in ROE during the New REIT 
Era. Our annual and cumulative results for the REIT Ma-
turity Era, however, hint that improvements in the indus-
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of the “within,” “between,” “entry,” and “exit” effects all em-
ploy simple averages of the initial (t–1) and final (t) year 
weights. In addition, the Bennet dynamic decomposition 
eliminates Haltiwanger’s (1997) “covariance” effect as it 
emerges because of the method of decomposition.8
Since we apply the Bennet dynamic decomposition to 
the U.S. REIT industry, our derivation of the various dy-
namic decompositions employs industry ROE as an illus-
tration. Although we undertake our work based on FFO, 
our presentation below follows the NI notation since this 
definition of ROE is more widely known. At time t, the 











t i tiNI NI==∑ ; ,1t
n
t i tiE E==∑ ; nt is the number 
of REITs.
After substitution and rearrangement, we get
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where: ,i tr  equals the ratio of NI to E for REIT i in period 
t and .i tθ  equals the i-th REIT’s share of industry equity.
We want to decompose the change in industry ROE 
into “within,” “between,” “entry,” and “exit” effects. The 
change in industry ROE equals the following:
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The number of REITs in period t equals the number 
of REITS in period t–1 plus the number of REIT entrants 
minus the number of REIT exits. That is,
1 1
enter exit
t t t tn n n n− −= + − . (4)
Rearranging terms in Equation (4) yields
1 1 / 1
stayenter exit
t t t t t tn n n n n− − −− = − = ; or (5)
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stay exit
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Bennet (1920) specifies the analogy to the Fisher ideal price 
index for changes in revenue – the sum of prices times quanti-
ties. We employ Bennet’s approach to the change in the average 
ROE, which equals the sum of the individual REIT’s ROE times 
that individual REIT’s equity share [see Equations (2) and (3)]. 
Diewert (2005) provides an extensive discussion of the Bennet 
index, showing that the Bennet index equals the arithmetic av-
erage of the Laspeyres and Paasche difference index analogies.
8 Griliches and Regev (1995) employ this decomposition in 
studying productivity in Israel. Scarpetta et  al. (2002) brief-
ly describe the Griliches and Regev (1995) and Haltiwanger 
(1997) methods of decomposition, noting how they differ. Fol-
lowing Jeon and Miller (2005), we, however, link the differ-
ences to the base-year weighting issue. Bartelsman et al. (2004) 
note that the covariance term disappears for their decompo-
sition. Balk (2003) also provides an extensive review of the 
Bennet decomposition in terms of productivity changes.
9 Consider two time periods (t–1) and (t). We classify REITs as 
staying, if the REITs exists in both (t–1) and (t); entering, if 
the REIT does not exist in (t–1) but does in (t); and exiting, if 
the REIT exists in (t–1) but not in (t).
Thus, Equation (3) adjusts as follows:
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Case 1: Existing dynamic decomposition  – Laspeyres dif-
ference index
While we already separate the “stay” terms from the “en-
try” and “exit” terms, we now need to decompose the 
“stay” terms into the “within” and “between” effects. Bailey 
et al. (1992) and Haltiwanger (1997) weight the “within” 
effect with the individual firm’s industry share of equity 
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where: , , , 1i t i t i t∆ −θ = θ − θ  and , , , 1i t i t i tr r r∆ −= − .
Then, we can rewrite Equation (8) as follows:
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where we evaluate the “between,” “entry,” and “exit” effects 
relative to the lagged industry ROE ( 1tR − ). For example, 
the “between” effect sums the differences between each 
REIT’s ROE and the industry’s ROE, multiplied by that 
REIT’s change in equity share. In this case, we evaluate the 
REIT’s ROE in period t and the industry’s ROE in period 
t–1.11
Case 2: Alternative dynamic decomposition – Paasche dif-
ference index
We decompose the change in industry ROE by weight-
ing the “within” effect by period-t individual REIT’s share 
of industry equity.12 In other words, we need to add and 
subtract / 1 ¯1
stay
t tn
i t i ti r
−
−= θ∑  to Equation (7). After necessary 
manipulations, the final form equals:
10 Diewert (2005) calls this the Laspeyres difference index.
11 Because of the timing difference, Haltiwanger (1997) decom-
poses the “between (reallocation)” effect into a “share” effect 
and a “covariance” effect contained in the “between” effect 
summation. Stiroh (2000) further decomposes the “within,” 
“share,” and “covariance” effects into effects for banks that ac-
quire other banks and banks that do not. Our Bennet decom-
position also eliminates this problem, as the “covariance” effect 
disappears.
12 Diewert (2005) calls this the Paasche difference index.
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where we evaluate the “between,” “entry,” and “exit” effects 
relative to the current industry ROE ( tR ).13
Case 3: Bennet dynamic decomposition
The Bennet dynamic decomposition computes the arith-
metic average of Case 1 and Case 2 as follows:14
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The Bennet dynamic decomposition includes four ef-
fects. The “within” effect equals the summation of each 
REIT’s change in ROE weighted by its average share of 
industry equity between period t–1 and period t. The 
“between (reallocation)” effect equals the summation of 
the difference between each REIT’s ROE and the average 
industry ROE between period t and period t–1, multiplied 
by the change in that REIT’s share of industry equity. The 
“entry” effect equals the summation of the difference be-
tween each entry REIT’s ROE in period t and the average 
industry ROE between period t–1 and period t times the 
entry REIT’s share of industry equity in period t. Finally, 
the “exit” effect equals the summation of the difference be-
tween each exit REIT’s ROE in period t–1 and the average 
industry ROE between period t–1 and period t, multiplied 
by the exit REIT’s share of industry equity in period t–1.
1.2. Development of hypotheses
Schumpeter (1950, Chp VII) coined the phrase “creative 
destruction” to describe his view of capitalism, evolving 
through a dynamic process of mergers, entry, and exit of 
firms spurred by innovation and technical change. Bartels-
man et al. (2004) associate the “reallocation (between),” “en-
try,” and “exit” effects of productivity change with creative 
destruction, which they call restructuring, reallocation, and 
creative destruction. Further, the authors note that perfor-
mance differences between the entering and exiting firms 
will not likely by themselves sufficiently measure the crea-
13 Note, also, that for the between effect, the lagged ROE for 
each REIT replaces the current ROE between Equations (9) 
and (10).
14 See Diewert (2005) for additional details. Jeon and Miller 
(2005) also provide the derivation.
tive destruction contribution since distortions may occur, 
even simultaneously, in a given country. For example, some 
policies may treat some incumbents more favorably, others 
may increase entry barriers, while some others may make 
exit more likely for some firms (e.g., poorly functioning fi-
nancial markets for young and small businesses).
On the one hand, high capital intensity and regulatory 
cash holding requirements to meet the legally mandated 
periodic dividend payout ratios characterize the REIT in-
dustry. Yet, there has been a substantial jump in the firm 
valuations as well as the investors’ interests in the REITs 
so much so that several countries have adopted the REIT 
structure since the late 1990s. So, the public must main-
tain its confidence in the soundness of the REIT industry. 
A process of creative destruction in the REIT industry, if 
too large, may undermine the public’s confidence. Since 
stability is a hallmark of a sound REIT industry and some 
of the surviving REITs have grown considerably, dominat-
ing the sector over time, we postulate that the “within” 
effect, i.e., the temporal growth of surviving REITs, should 
be the dominant component of the annual movements in 
aggregate REIT performance.
On the other hand, Figure 1 shows the movement 
in the number of REITs -- increases from the middle of 
1980s until the early 1990s, declines from the mid-1990s 
until mid-2000s, and then increases once again since mid-
2000s. Eyeballing the temporal market valuations of REITs 
since the late 1990s indicates the considerable growth in 
the size of some of the sample REITs, backed by inclusion 
in the S&P indices starting with October 2001. These pat-
terns lead us to postulate that the “reallocation or between” 
effect should be the dominant component of the annual 
movements in aggregate REIT performance.
We do not possess any a priori reason to expect that 
the “within” effect will dominate the “between” effect (or 
vice versa). This remains an empirical matter.
Now we consider how the component effects associate 
with the REIT industry specific sub-periods. We expect 
that the “within” effect should dominate the “between” 
effect during the New REIT Era. This is the period that 
witnessed the temporal growth of the REITs in response 
to the (1) then-newly introduced sector-specific regula-
tory incentives and (2) substantially enhanced access to 
the capital markets through embracing the rules set by the 
Wall Street establishment.
The indeterminacy, as just expressed above for the en-
tire sample period, between the “within” versus “between” 
effects extends itself into other sub-period examinations. 
Once again, we do not have any a priori reason to expect 
that the “within” effect will dominate the “between” ef-
fect (or vice versa) during the REIT Maturity Era and that 
the “within” and “between” effects of the New REIT Era 
will differ from their counterparts of the REIT Maturity 
Era. All these time-dependent differences also remain an 
empirical matter.
Focusing individually on either the More-transparent 
or the Less-transparent REIT sub-sample leads to the 
same conjectures about the temporal behavior of the 
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“within” and “between” effects, as just explained for the 
entire sample above. Meanwhile, considering compara-
tively the More- and Less-transparent sub-samples offers 
the conjecture that both the “within” and “between” ef-
fects of the More-transparent sub-sample of REITs should 
dominate their counterparts of the Less-transparent sub-
sample of REITs.
We also postulate that concentration should influence 
positively the REIT industry’s aggregated profitability. This 
follows from the observation that a few number of REITs 
had grown quite a bit in the time period leading up to 
the first REIT listing in the S&P500 Index in early Octo-
ber 2001, opening the door for the beginning of the REIT 
Maturity Era.
2. Data and sample
We build our database by merging distinct variables with 
annual frequency available in the COMPUSTAT, supple-
mented to the extent possible, by CRSP/ZIMAN databases 
and as compiled and kindly provided to us by NAREIT.15 
When a variable does not appear in these sources or con-
tains several missing values, data collected from either 
15 We thank Brad Case for kindly providing us with data from 
NAREIT’s resources, Erkan Yonder for helping us in identify-
ing and collecting some of our data from various sources, and 
Steve Cauley for his comments that guided us in cross check-
ing our data vis-a-via the CRSP/ZIMAN database.
Internet searches or the EDGAR database enter into our 
own database. Our FFO-based (NI-based) sample covers 
the Equity REITs that report no negative values between 
1989 and 2015 (1980–2015), respectively. Feng et al.’s (2011) 
classification of REITs, especially between 1993 and 2015, 
guides us in identifying the sample firms. Further, we re-
strict the sample firms’ ROE to fall between –100% to 100% 
to avoid the distortions due to outliers and report annu-
ally both equally weighted, EW, and total equity weighted, 
TEQW, industry ROEs. There are a total of 33 observations 
(= 18 less than –100% plus 15 higher than 100%) deleted 
from our sample due to this restriction. That is less than 1% 
of the total number of 3,888 observations in our sample.
Despite our efforts to build a comprehensive data-
base, missing data to construct ROE remain an obstacle 
and reduce our sample size. We provide a comprehensive 
analysis of the evolution of our sample and sub-samples by 
decomposition categories and annually across the sample 
period in the Results section below.
Panels A and B of Table  1 tabulate the descriptive 
statistics for our key variables of FFO, TA, TE, and ROE 
(FFO-based)  = FFO/TE (and to be comprehensive, also 
NI, and ROE (NI-based)  = NI/TE) by sample year and 
Table 1. Annual means and standard deviations of sample REITs’ net income, funds from operations, total assets, total equity, and 
ROE, during the sample period of 1989–2015
Panel A: Net income, funds from operations, total assets and total equity
Year
Net income ($Million) Fund fromoperations ($Million) Total assets ($Million) Total equity ($Million)
No. of
REITs Mean Std. Dev.
No. of
REITs Mean Std. Dev.
No. of
REITs Mean Std. Dev.
No. of
REITs Mean Std. Dev.
1989 51 1.700 20.356 19 11.111 8.298 51 156.573 132.722 51 84.630 63.682
1990 53 3.600 13.442 20 11.505 9.664 53 161.138 138.389 53 81.383 62.878
1991 73 3.301 10.177 41 9.888 11.352 73 142.953 141.187 73 79.068 69.683
1992 76 3.157 11.271 51 10.560 11.574 76 161.904 160.836 76 85.822 91.075
1993 128 5.127 12.024 90 14.845 15.075 128 252.215 250.424 128 135.635 130.204
1994 167 9.800 12.227 134 20.870 19.409 167 335.718 335.710 167 164.779 159.877
1995 167 13.443 17.648 144 29.043 28.628 167 417.484 419.358 167 205.887 234.198
1996 158 20.621 25.925 137 40.546 41.294 158 606.912 672.788 158 310.996 357.428
1997 170 29.554 33.606 151 57.262 62.121 170 1026.730 1345.200 170 546.402 764.011
1998 174 45.593 107.848 152 90.571 117.005 174 1597.270 2320.180 174 744.652 1055.080
1999 167 43.132 127.810 143 106.864 125.877 167 1764.170 2347.770 167 819.029 1096.840
2000 153 59.134 94.287 131 119.197 149.362 153 1821.290 2493.310 153 826.394 1179.050
2001 144 52.424 96.478 124 118.744 163.664 144 1914.690 2941.280 144 876.034 1429.000
2002 138 58.372 121.291 116 129.722 194.187 138 2211.650 3169.230 138 962.000 1450.790
2003 140 72.527 128.152 119 129.241 191.007 140 2347.180 3119.380 140 1011.310 1405.880
2004 149 71.539 111.244 126 129.841 181.839 149 2540.430 3849.180 149 1008.820 1399.990
2005 150 79.152 140.470 128 130.104 190.651 150 2752.380 3909.700 150 1045.830 1384.560
2006 129 116.456 189.894 112 173.453 243.306 129 3486.550 4604.300 129 1327.590 1693.730
2007 116 134.000 221.500 108 202.652 285.796 116 3834.080 4902.030 116 1361.650 1637.620
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Year
Net income ($Million) Fund fromoperations ($Million) Total assets ($Million) Total equity ($Million)
No. of
REITs Mean Std. Dev.
No. of
REITs Mean Std. Dev.
No. of
REITs Mean Std. Dev.
No. of
REITs Mean Std. Dev.
2008 112 82.295 165.122 105 184.293 264.255 112 3875.590 4868.430 112 1362.560 1593.290
2009 110 24.430 153.293 104 146.635 241.555 110 3625.980 4206.450 110 1468.160 1786.590
2010 120 31.283 249.513 113 152.056 279.079 120 3907.350 4921.910 120 1633.790 2007.640
2011 122 74.920 187.159 116 200.076 317.337 122 4151.470 5442.460 122 1776.660 2389.220
2012 130 96.143 213.904 125 229.032 359.821 130 4501.030 5751.930 130 1934.300 2473.240
2013 154 112.724 242.169 146 234.738 371.928 154 4511.260 5803.320 154 2007.490 2564.980
2014 169 142.029 297.558 157 270.122 399.221 169 4869.580 5986.000 169 2150.670 2672.330
2015 165 155.950 311.953 152 298.064 431.225 165 5362.690 6357.260 165 2351.990 2916.990
All 3855 57.248 158.649 3064 134.058 246.527 3855 2256.880 3971.750 3855 962.182 1676.870
Panel B: ROE based on net income or funds from operations
ROE(%) – NI-based ROE(%) – FFO-based
Year No of REITs EW-Mean Std. Dev. TEQW-Mean No of REITs EW-Mean Std. Dev.
TEQW-
Mean
1989 51 0.129 20.851 0.637 19 11.495 6.682 11.815
1990 53 2.762 15.059 2.158 20 11.804 6.824 12.967
1991 73 2.343 14.680 3.779 41 9.998 7.349 10.751
1992 76 1.324 18.013 3.958 51 9.550 5.762 10.463
1993 128 2.189 14.946 3.811 90 10.111 7.891 9.530
1994 167 5.453 12.821 5.876 134 14.542 14.535 11.648
1995 167 5.247 11.626 6.470 144 15.300 15.467 12.618
1996 158 6.623 7.982 6.640 137 13.790 8.482 11.782
1997 170 6.544 6.758 5.440 151 11.668 8.016 9.851
1998 174 4.621 10.693 6.071 152 14.939 19.981 11.396
1999 167 7.295 9.511 5.397 143 22.082 84.668 12.623
2000 153 7.811 15.205 7.404 131 15.694 15.493 13.386
2001 144 3.573 16.247 5.578 124 17.098 32.907 12.621
2002 138 4.167 13.199 6.148 116 13.561 9.536 12.581
2003 140 4.995 11.230 7.381 119 13.999 26.412 12.344
2004 149 6.987 11.287 7.190 126 11.847 14.909 12.219
2005 150 5.869 13.315 7.588 128 12.881 14.505 11.825
2006 129 7.860 8.807 8.768 112 11.956 21.591 12.423
2007 116 7.789 11.895 9.924 108 20.373 48.426 14.774
2008 112 6.424 12.632 6.039 105 14.004 13.031 12.760
2009 110 3.684 16.978 2.141 104 8.633 16.545 9.386
2010 120 1.301 10.163 1.935 113 8.827 10.597 8.975
2011 122 1.370 12.262 4.070 116 10.431 7.697 10.786
2012 130 2.619 10.841 5.001 125 11.246 8.361 11.508
2013 154 3.862 10.500 5.576 146 11.178 9.169 11.601
2014 169 4.373 12.209 6.745 157 12.352 12.794 12.309
2015 165 4.976 11.810 6.606 152 14.054 17.200 12.914
All 3855 5.332 12.597 6.993 3064 13.452 25.235 11.773
Note: We construct our sample mainly from COMPUSTAT data, supplemented by the CRSP/Ziman and EDGAR databases and various internet 
searches. We restrict each firm’s ROE to fall between –100% to 100% where ROE = NI/TE or ROE = FFO/TE by each sample year. To calculate the 
Bennet dynamic decomposition between two years, say 1999 and 2000, we need to identify and separate entrants (REITs that entered the industry), 
exits (REITs that exited the industry or converted to private ownership), and stays (REITs that stayed in the industry). To do so, we matched REIT ID 
numbers and tickers in our merged database. If a REIT ID number or ticker exists in both 1999 and 2000, then the REIT stays in the industry. If a 
REIT ID number or ticker exists in 1999, but not in 2000, then the REIT exits. If a REIT ID number or ticker exists in 2000, but not in 1999, then the 
REIT enters. In Panel B, EW and TEQW indicate equally weighted and total equity weighted, respectively. The EW- and TEQW-based  ROE values 
follow from Equation (2) and refer to the industry level ROE (e.g., for NI-based industry ROE in a given sample year = Sum of net income across all 
sample REITs/Sum of their total equity).
End of Table 1
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Table 2. Evolution of the number of sample REITs for the entire sample and various sub-samples
All publicly traded REITs: 
No of REITs in each 
component
Sample REITs: No of REITs 
in each component
More-transparent sub-
sample: No of REITs in 
each component
Less-transparent sub-
sample: No of REITs in 
each component
Time period Enter Stay Exit Enter Stay Exit Enter Stay Exit Enter Stay Exit
1989–1990 1 71 1 1 52 0 1 19 0 0 33 0
1990–1991 20 71 1 20 53 0 3 20 0 17 33 0
1991–1992 4 88 3 3 73 0 3 23 0 0 50 0
1992–1993 55 88 4 53 75 0 35 26 0 18 49 0
1993–1994 47 140 3 47 120 1 28 60 1 19 60 0
1994–1995 14 180 7 13 154 1 5 81 1 8 73 0
1995–1996 8 184 10 8 150 4 4 81 1 4 69 3
1996–1997 27 173 19 26 144 0 18 78 0 8 66 0
1997–1998 23 183 17 21 153 1 12 87 0 9 66 1
1998–1999 7 184 22 7 160 5 0 91 1 7 69 4
1999–2000 5 173 18 5 148 7 3 79 4 2 69 3
2000–2001 6 165 13 6 138 3 1 74 2 5 64 1
2001–2002 7 157 14 7 131 3 3 67 2 4 64 1
2002–2003 10 157 7 9 131 1 5 69 1 4 62 0
2003–2004 21 153 14 21 128 4 7 69 0 14 59 4
2004–2005 13 160 14 13 137 3 4 69 1 9 68 2
2005–2006 4 160 13 4 125 3 1 63 0 3 62 3
2006–2007 3 145 19 3 113 3 0 57 0 3 56 3
2007–2008 2 125 23 2 110 0 1 53 0 1 57 0
2008–2009 2 120 7 2 108 4 0 51 3 2 57 1
2009–2010 12 122 0 12 108 0 6 50 0 6 58 0
2010–2011 9 133 1 9 113 1 3 54 0 6 59 1
2011–2012 11 139 3 10 120 1 4 56 0 6 64 1
2012–2013 28 148 2 26 128 0 9 60 0 17 68 0
2013–2014 18 170 6 16 153 1 7 69 0 9 84 1
2014–2015 20 186 2 17 148 0 6 62 0 11 86 0
Note: We construct our sample mainly from COMPUSTAT data, supplemented by the CRSP/Ziman and EDGAR databases and various interest searches. 
We restrict each firm’s ROE to fall between –100% to 100%. To calculate the Bennet dynamic decomposition between two years, say 1999 and 2000, we 
need to identify and separate entrants (REITs that entered the industry), exits (REITs that exited the industry or converted to private ownership), and 
stays (REITs that stayed in the industry). To do so, we matched REIT ID numbers and tickers in our merged database. If a REIT ID number or ticker 
exists in both 1999 and 2000, then the REIT stays in the industry. If a REIT ID number or ticker exists in 1999, but not in 2000, then the REIT exits. 
If a REIT ID number or ticker exists in 2000, but not in 1999, then the REIT enters. We follow Chen et al. (2012) and group sample Equity REITs that 
invest in apartments, industrials, offices, regional malls, and shopping centers as the More-transparent subset, and group all other Equity REITs as the 
Less-transparent sub-sample.
for the entire sample period. Panels A and B of Figure 1 
provide the evolution of the FTSE NAREIT All Equity 
REIT series’ (1) annual number of REITs and their year-
end market values for the entire sample and (2) the total 
return and price return series between 1971 and 2017.
Data for OLS estimations come from NAREIT for the 
annual total market capitalization of Equity REITs and the 
annual number of Equity REITs, Jay Ritter’s website (2020) 
for the annual number of IPOs (https://site.warrington.ufl.
edu/ritter/ipo-data/), and COMPUSTAT for HHI.
To calculate the dynamic decomposition between two 
years, say 1999 and 2000, we need to identify and separate 
entrants (REITs that entered the industry), exits (REITs 
that exited the industry or converted to private owner-
ship), and stays (REITs that stayed in the industry). To do 
so, we matched REIT ID numbers and tickers in our 
merged database. If a REIT ID number or ticker exists in 
both 1999 and 2000, then the REIT stays in the industry. 
If a REIT ID number or ticker exists in 1999, but not in 
2000, then the REIT exits. If a REIT ID number or ticker 
exists in 2000, but not in 1999, then the REIT enters. Ta-
ble 2 provides the number of REITs for each category for 
the (1) full NAREIT sample in the industry, (2) our sam-
ple of REITs, and (3) and (4), our sub-samples of More-
transparent (Less-transparent) REITs, respectively, where, 
following Chen et  al. (2012), Equity REIT sub-sectors 
of Apartments, Industrials, Offices, Regional Malls and 
Shopping Centers (all remaining Equity REIT sub-sectors) 
are components of the More-transparent (Less-transpar-
ent) sub-sample, respectively.
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For clarity of the ensuing presentation in the light of 
the information above, it is useful to highlight the sequen-
tial REIT periods and some of their sub-periods, over 
which we study the REIT industry’s annual ROE changes:
a) Vintage Period: 1989–1990;
b) New REIT Era: 1990–1991 through 2000–2001;
c) REIT Maturity Era: 2001–2002 through 2014–2015;
1) Initial REIT Maturity Era: 2001–2002 through 
2006–2007;
2) REIT Maturity Era without GFC: 2001–2002 
through 2006–2007 and 2009–2010 through 
2014–2015;
d) GFC-I: 2007–2008;
e) GFC-II: 2007–2008 and 2008–2009.
3. Results
Table 3 and Figure 2 provide the annual evolution of each 
Bennet effect and the “change in ROE” during our sample 
period. An eyeballing of the time paths in Figure 2 sug-
gests that the “within” effect follows overall the “change 
in ROE.”
Table 3. Evolution of the Bennet dynamic decomposition, funds from operations-based ROE changes: 1989–2015
Years Within Between Entry Exit ΔROE
1989–1990 0.0132 0.0010 –0.0027 0.0000 0.0115
1990–1991 –0.0117 0.0008 –0.0111 0.0000 –0.0220
1991–1992 –0.0076 0.0020 –0.0035 0.0000 –0.0090
1992–1993 –0.0043 –0.0040 –0.0040 0.0000 –0.0123
1993–1994 0.0311 –0.0057 –0.0044 0.0000 0.0211
1994–1995 0.0046 0.0030 –0.0014 0.0000 0.0062
1995–1996 –0.0101 0.0041 –0.0028 –0.0002 –0.0086
1996–1997 –0.0058 –0.0068 –0.0090 0.0000 –0.0216
1997–1998 0.0133 0.0010 0.0008 0.0000 0.0151
1998–1999 0.0149 –0.0006 0.0003 –0.0009 0.0155
1999–2000 0.0086 –0.0010 0.0003 0.0002 0.0077
2000–2001 –0.0050 –0.0016 –0.0001 0.0004 –0.0071
2001–2002 0.0006 0.0018 –0.0027 –0.0004 0.0001
2002–2003 –0.0041 0.0017 –0.0004 0.0000 –0.0028
2003–2004 –0.0006 0.0031 –0.0025 –0.0001 0.0000
2004–2005 –0.0023 0.0015 –0.0020 0.0001 –0.0029
2005–2006 0.0064 –0.0019 –0.0013 0.0000 0.0032
2006–2007 0.0194 –0.0042 –0.0024 –0.0006 0.0134
2007–2008 –0.0183 –0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 –0.0186
2008–2009 –0.0346 0.0049 –0.0001 0.0039 –0.0337
2009–2010 –0.0013 –0.0002 –0.0026 0.0000 –0.0042
2010–2011 0.0238 –0.0044 –0.0009 –0.0004 0.0188
2011–2012 0.0055 0.0000 0.0013 –0.0003 0.0070
2012–2013 0.0057 –0.0022 –0.0028 0.0000 0.0007
2013–2014 0.0131 –0.0079 0.0006 0.0000 0.0059
2014–2015 0.0047 –0.0022 0.0001 0.0000 0.0026
Note: The change in ROE between any two years equals the sum of the Within, Between, and Entry effects minus the Exit effect. Stay, Enter, and Exit 
refer to the number of REITs that stay, enter, and exit for each of the two-year pairs. In Panels B, C and D, the Vintage Period-89/90, the New REIT 
Era, the Initial REIT Maturity Era, the REIT Maturity Era, the REIT Maturity Era without GFC, GFC-I and GFC-II cover the cumulative of the results 
for each component for the sample years (1) (1990 minus 1989), (2) (1991 minus 1990) through (2001 minus 2000), (3) (2002 minus 2001) through 
(2007 minus 2006), (4) (2002 minus 2001) through (2015 minus 2014), (5) [(2002 minus 2001) through (2007 minus 2006)] & [(2010 minus 2009) 
through (2015 minus. 2014)], (6) (2008 minus 2007), and (7) (2008 minus 2007) & (2009 minus 2008), respectively. The More-transparent sub-sample 
includes Equity REITs with investment focus on apartments, industrials, offices, regional malls, and shopping centers. The Less-transparent sub-sample 
includes all other Equity REITs.
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Note: This graph illustrates the annual evolution of each of the “within,” “between,” “entry,” and “exit” effects on the annual 
“changes in the REIT industry’s ROE.” The illustrated effects are based on our own computations and empirical work.
Figure 2. Evolution of the Bennet decomposition effects, 1989–2015
3.1. Estimates of the Bennet effects16
Panels A, B and C of Table 4 provide summary statistics 
on each Bennet decomposition effect for the Full sample, 
the More-transparent sub-sample, and the Less-transpar-
ent sub-sample, respectively. A closer look at the tabulated 
results across the panels demonstrates GFC’s considerable 
adverse influences on all Bennet effects as well as the 
“change in ROE.” GFC’s effects tend to be visibly more 
pronounced on the More-transparent sub-sample in Panel 
B and on the “within” effect across all panels. Overall, our 
results suggest a dominant role for the “within” effect dur-
ing the entire sample period and demonstrates the breath-
taking adverse consequences of the GFC.
In Panel A, the sum of “changes in ROE” over the en-
tire sample period is –1.42%. The “within” effect, with a 
sum of 5.92%, dominates the other components. The cor-
responding sums for the “between” and “entry” effects are 
–1.83% and -5.31%, respectively. A removal of the GFC 
16 The FFO-based results differ substantially in magnitude and 
signs from their unreported NI-based counterparts. The sums 
of NI-based “change in ROE,” “within,” “between,” “entry” 
and “exit” effects are –4.79%, –2.48%, 9.65%, –5.06% and 
–2.68% respectively. Further, the GFC’s erosions on the FFO-
based measurements are similar to their unreported NI-based 
counterparts for the More- transparent sub-sample. They are, 
however, much more significant for the Less-transparent sub-
sample.
years generates sums (1) for the entire sample period, of 
3.83% for the “change in ROE” and 11.21%, –2.27%, and 
–5.32% for the “within,” “between,” and “entry,” effects and 
(2) for the REIT Maturity Era, of 4.18% for the “change 
in ROE” and 7.09%, –1.50% and –1.57% for the “within,” 
“between,” and “entry” effects, respectively.
A comparison of the effect-by-effect temporal sums 
between the More- and Less transparent sub-samples, 
presented in Panels B and C, demonstrates considerable 
differences in the magnitudes and signs of all, especially 
the “within” and “between,” effects. While many sums of 
the “within” effect of the More-transparent sub-sample are 
mainly positive, the corresponding sums of the “between” 
effect are mainly negative. Further, the magnitudes of the 
temporal sums, in absolute value, of the “within” (“be-
tween”) effect are visibly larger for the More-transparent 
(Less-transparent) sub-sample than the Less-transparent 
(More-transparent) sub-sample, respectively.
The estimates of the “between” effect are mostly nega-
tive for both the Full sample and the More-transparent 
sub-sample. They attain positive values for the Less-trans-
parent sub-sample. The More-transparent REITs tend to 
have easier access to the resources of the capital markets. 
This unexpected outcome in the “between” effects in fa-
vor of the Less-transparent sub-sample hints that REITs in 
the More-transparent sub-sample tend to miss the optimal 
timing for restructuring their asset portfolios and/or exit-
ing from the industry.
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Table 4. Evolution of the Bennet dynamic decomposition, funds from operations based ROE: 1989–2015
Panel A: Cumulative; full sample; entire sample period and REIT sub-period results
REIT period Within Between Entry Exit ΔROE
Full Sample, Sum 5.9227 –1.8293 –5.3139 0.1981 –1.4186
Full Sample, Average 0.2278 –0.0704 –0.2044 0.0076 –0.0546
Vintage Period-89/90, Sum 1.3236 0.0981 –0.2694 0.0000 1.1522
New REIT Era, Sum 2.7967 –0.8845 –3.4664 –0.0376 –1.5166
Initial REIT Maturity Era, Sum 1.9367 0.1919 –1.1266 –0.0925 1.0945
REIT Maturity Era, Sum 1.8024 –1.0429 –1.5781 0.2357 –1.0543
REIT Maturity Era (w/o GFC-II), Sum 7.0891 –1.4987 –1.5674 –0.1592 4.1823
GFC-I, Sum –1.8298 –0.0326 0.0000 0.0000 –1.8624
GFC-II, Sum –5.2867 0.4557 –0.0107 0.3949 –5.2366
Year Pair Count: Positive & Negative 14 & 12 12 & 14 7 & 19 18 & 8 14 & 12
Panel B: Cumulative; the more-transparent sub-sample; entire sample period and REIT sub-period results
REIT period Within Between Entry Exit ΔROE
Full Sample, Sum 7.2823 –2.6587 –6.3232 0.6701 –2.3696
Full Sample, Average 0.2801 –0.1023 –0.2432 0.0258 –0.0911
Vintage Period-89/90, Sum 1.3853 0.1041 –0.4250 0.0000 1.0643
New REIT Era, Sum 2.7108 –0.2238 –3.7530 0.0423 –1.3083
Initial REIT Maturity Era, Sum 3.5951 –0.6699 –0.9516 –0.0878 2.0615
REIT Maturity Era, Sum 3.1861 –2.5390 –2.1451 0.6278 –2.1257
REIT Maturity Era (w/o GFC-II), Sum 9.3605 –2.9969 –2.1451 –0.0878 4.3063
GFC-I, Sum –2.7870 –0.0728 0.0000 0.0000 –2.8598
GFC-II, Sum –6.1744 0.4580 0.0000 0.7156 –6.4320
Year Pair Count: Positive & Negative 16 & 10 10 & 16 7 & 19 22 & 4 14 & 12
Panel C: Cumulative; the less-transparent sub-sample; entire sample period and REIT sub-period results
REIT period Within Between Entry Exit ΔROE
Full Sample, Sum 2.1980 0.0812 –3.3494 –0.2426 –0.8277
Full Sample, Average 0.0845 0.0031 –0.1288 –0.0093 –0.0318
Vintage Period-89/90, Sum 1.2766 –0.0618 0.0000 0.0000 1.2147
New REIT Era, Sum 2.2848 –1.7885 –2.7061 –0.2762 –1.9336
Initial REIT Maturity Era, Sum –1.8165 2.5217 –0.9605 0.1784 –0.4337
REIT Maturity Era, Sum –1.3634 1.9315 –0.6433 0.0336 –0.1089
REIT Maturity Era (w/o GFC-II), Sum 2.8826 1.4650 –0.6302 0.0336 3.6836
GFC-I, Sum –0.7104 0.0922 0.0000 0.0000 –0.6183
GFC-II, Sum –4.2460 0.4666 –0.0131 0.0000 –3.7925
Year Pair Count: Positive & Negative 16 & 10 14 & 12 9 & 17 20 & 6 14 & 12
Note: The change in ROE between any two years equals the sum of the Within, Between, and Entry effects minus the Exit effect. Stay, Enter, and Exit 
refer to the number of REITs that stay, enter, and exit for each of the two-year pairs. In Panels B, C and D, the Vintage Period-89/90, the New REIT 
Era, the Initial REIT Maturity Era, the REIT Maturity Era, the REIT Maturity Era without GFC, GFC-I and GFC-II cover the cumulative of the results 
for each component for the sample years (1) (1990 minus 1989), (2) (1991 minus 1990) through (2001 minus 2000), (3) (2002 minus 2001) through 
(2007 minus 2006), (4) (2002 minus 2001) through (2015 minus 2014), (5) [(2002 minus 2001) through (2007 minus 2006)] & [(2010 minus 2009) 
through (2015 minus. 2014)], (6) (2008 minus 2007), and (7) (2008 minus 2007) & (2009 minus 2008), respectively. The More-transparent sub-sample 
includes Equity REITs with investment focus on apartments, industrials, offices, regional malls, and shopping centers. The Less-transparent sub-sample 
includes all other Equity REITs.
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In Panels B and C, the “change in ROE” is surprisingly 
less for the Less-transparent sub-sample than the More-
transparent sub-sample. Interestingly, the more muted 
responses to the GFC’s unexpected erosions, especially in 
the “within” effect during the 2007–2008 period, of the 
Less-transparent sub-sample appear to account for this 
difference.
3.2. Uni-variate tests
We examine a set of 100 mean and/or median difference 
tests to examine whether:
 – the “within” effect differs from the “between” effect 
in the (1) Full sample, (2) More-transparent sub-
sample, and (3) Less-transparent sub-sample across 
the entire sample period or sub-sample periods, as 
specified above and unique to the REIT industry;
 – each of the “within” and “between” effects, as meas-
ured for the More-transparent sub-sample, differs 
from their counterparts, as measured for the Less-
transparent sub-sample, across the entire sample pe-
riod and the unique sub-sample periods.
These tests, not reported in a table to save space, are 
to provide an answer for some of our hypotheses as put 
forth in the Development of Hypotheses section above. We 
acknowledge in advance that small sample size constraint 
limits the scope of each of these tests. Overall, coupled 
with the results in the Uni-variate Results section above, 
evidence continues to show, albeit not as strongly as we 
expected, the dominance of the “within” effect. That is, the 
sample REITs’ annual “changes in ROE” originate more 
from the surviving firms’ growth over time.
Parametric tests reveal statistically significant positive 
differences, mostly at the 5% level,17 in the means of:
 – {“within” minus “between”} effects in the (1) Full and 
(2) More-transparent sub-sample during the REIT 
Maturity Era after excluding the GFC’s influences;
 – {“between” minus “between”} effects, for the Less-
transparent sub-sample, between (1) the Initial REIT 
Maturity Era and the New REIT Era and (2) the 
REIT Maturity Era and the New REIT Era;
 – {“between” minus “between”} effects between the 
Less-transparent sub-sample and the More-transpar-
ent sub-sample during (1) the REIT Maturity Era, 
(2) the Initial REIT Maturity Era, and (3) the REIT 
Maturity Era without the GFC’s effects.
The Wilcoxon sign-rank or Wilcoxon rank-sum tests 
on the same comparisons reveal weakly significant median 
17 The REIT Maturity Era post-GFC is not a period of focus in 
this study. Yet, the tests on the mean differences of the “be-
tween” effects during this period, (i.e., 2009–2010 through 
2014–2015) and the Initial REIT Maturity Era (i.e., 2000–2001 
through 2006–2007) for the full sample and the Less-transpar-
ent sub-sample are negative and significant. That is, the “be-
tween” effect was more pronounced for the Less-transparent 
sub-sample during the initial years than during the post-GFC 
years of the REIT Maturity Era.
differences in the {“within” minus “between”} effects in 
the (1) Full sample and (2) More-transparent sub-sample 
during the REIT Maturity Era after excluding the GFC’s 
influences.
Keeping in mind the caveat of small sample size, only 
the positive and significant differences, {the “within” mi-
nus the “between”} effects, observed for the Full sample 
and for the More-transparent sub-sample during the REIT 
Maturity Era after accounting for the GFC’s confounding 
effects, receive support from the parametric and non-
parametric tests. All other time-dependent differences 
between the “within” and the “between” effects appear to 
be statistically nil.
The More-transparent and the Less-transparent sub-
samples exhibit some differences. In particular, the Less-
transparent sub-sample’s the “between” effect dominates 
its counterpart during the REIT Maturity Era after exclud-
ing the GFC years. This finding is not consistent with our 
conjecture in the Development of Hypotheses section above. 
An examination of Panels B and C for this sub-period’s 
sums shows that while the REITs belonging to the More-
transparent segment chose a strategy of surviving REITs’ 
growth over reallocation of resources, those belonging to 
the Less-transparent sub-sample built a balanced strategy 
of surviving firms’ growth and reallocation of resources. It 
appears that the maturity reached by the industry has been 
more beneficial to the Less-transparent segment than the 
More-transparent segment, raising the possibility that the 
Less-transparent segment is closer in transparency today 
than before to the More-transparent segment.
3.3. OLS results
Table 5 reports the OLS estimation results on the annual 
“changes in ROE,” the “within” effect component, and 
the “between” effect component for the Full sample, the 
More-transparent sub-sample and the Less-transparent 
sub-sample, respectively. We noted earlier that a few num-
ber of REITs had grown quite a bit in the time period 
leading up to the first REIT listing in the S&P500 Index in 
early October 2001, opening the door for the beginning of 
the REIT Maturity Era. Results from rather small sample 
of 26 annual observations with only three independent 
variables offer no support for the conjecture that industry 
concentration, as measured by HHI, affects the industry’s 
profitability changes, its “within” effect or “between” effect 
components.
The concern for the degrees of freedom from a sample 
size of 26 annual observations on the dependent variables 
forces us to specify rather simple estimation models. That 
is, only three independent variables, which we discuss un-
der the Development of Hypotheses section above, enter the 
OLS models:
a) The aggregated REIT industry annual market valu-
ations (in natural log) controls for the association 
between the observed increases in the REIT indus-
try’s market valuations, evident in Figure 1, and the 
industry’s measured profitability metrics;
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b) The annual number of IPOs in the U.S. financial 
markets (in natural log) controls for how access to 
the financial markets relates to the industry’s profit-
ability metrics; and
c) The HHI, which captures the effect of the industry 
concentration on its profitability.
The only coefficient estimate in Table  5 that attains 
significance (at the 10% level) is positive and for the an-
nual number of IPOs under the “within” effect of the Less-
transparent sub-sample. All others coefficient estimates 
are insignificant in this table.
Conclusions
Our findings lead to a few novel and interesting conclu-
sions about the REIT industry’s profitability performance 
between 1989 and 2015. To the extent that our Equity 
REIT sample proxies for the FTSE NAREIT All Equity 
Index, our conclusions also relate to this index’s perfor-
mance between 1989 and 2015.
First, the sum of improved profitability of individu-
al REITs (i.e., the “within” effect) is considerably much 
larger than the sum of the temporal profitability changes 
of the REIT industry. Two factors offset the “within” ef-
fect’s influence. The sum of the shifts of resources from 
less to more profitable REITs (i.e., the “between” effect) 
is unexpectedly negative. Further, the GFC years between 
the 2007–2009 period generates a massive negative sum in 
the “within” effect and a slightly positive sum in the “be-
tween” effect. Removal of the sums pertaining to the GFC 
years amplifies more visibly the opposite movements of 
the “within” and “between” effects during the entire sam-
ple period. The same removal also boosts the sum of the 
temporal changes in ROE from –1.42% to 3.82% for the 
REIT industry.
Second, when cleaned from the GFC’s confounding ef-
fects, the sum of the “within” effect during the REIT Ma-
turity Era (i.e., 2001 through the present time) is about 
7.09%. This is 2.5 times larger than its counterpart, 2.8%, 
during the New REIT Era (i.e., 1991 through 2000). The 
corresponding figures of the “between” effect and the tem-
poral changes in ROE are –1.04% and –0.88% and 4.18% 
and –1.52%, respectively.
While the statistical tests on small sample sizes of-
fer only limited evidence of the differences in either the 
means or the medians for the conclusions in the para-
graphs above, the sums demonstrate that the improved 
profitability of the surviving REITs was the dominant force 
of the annual profitability changes of the REIT industry.
Other clear, yet surprising, conclusions arise from ex-
amining the sums of the Bennet effects under the GFC 
years. Both the resilience of the shifts of resources from less 
to more profitable REITs, especially during the 2007–2009 
period, and the sudden and prompt contraction in the prof-
itability of the surviving REITs are surprising. Clearly, the 
“between” effect acted as a partial risk management tool in 
remedying some of the GFC-driven damages to the REIT 
industry’s profitability, especially to its “within” effect. Com-
parisons of the results between the More- and Less-trans-
parent subsamples strengthen these conclusions.
Third, we focus mainly on the “within” and “between” 
effects. Yet, a few comments are in order for the REITs that 
enter the industry since they appear to exhibit a negative 
effect on the industry’s profitability changes. Given that en-
tering firms transform into surviving REITs, we infer that 
the entering firms learn promptly lessons from their junior 
years and rectify their operations to compete well with the 
others in this industry. These results appear largely consist-
ent with Schumpeter’s (1950) views even though the REIT 
industry operates under governmental distortions.
Table 5. OLS results on the annual changes in ROE, the “within” effect and the “between” effect



















Intercept –0.083 –0.086 0.012 –0.083 –0.098 0.022 –0.101* –0.089 –0.005
t-statistic (0.075) (0.085) (0.018) (0.102) (0.109) (0.021) (0.057) (0.073) (0.020)
[Ln(Average Market 
Capitalization)]
0.004 0.003 –0.001 0.003 0.004 –0.001 0.004 0.003 0.000
t-statistic (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
[Ln(Number of IPOs)] 0.006 0.008 –0.001 0.007 0.008 –0.001 0.007 0.009* –0.001
t-statistic (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.007) (0.007) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001)
[HHI] 0.413 0.422 0.049 0.423 0.568 –0.077 0.553 0.382 0.258
t-statistic (1.058) (1.193) (0.242) (1.374) (1.487) (0.288) (0.842) (0.979) (0.249)
Observations 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26
R-squared 0.108 0.149 0.134 0.073 0.095 0.134 0.150 0.191 0.220
Note: Ln(Average Market Capitalization), Ln(Number of IPOs), and HHI are the natural log of {total market capitalization of all relevant sample Equity 
REITs / the number of Equity REITs} in a sample year, the natural logarithm of the number of IPOs in the US financial markets in a sample year, and 
the annual Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for the REIT industry, respectively. Data are from NAREIT for the average market capitalization, Jay 
Ritter’s website for the annual number of IPOs in the US, and COMPUSTAT for HHI. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. * indicates 
statistical significance at the 10% level.
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Finally, what can we say about the industry’s economic 
efficiency? It is surprising that we are able to locate only 
one recent study on the economic efficiency of the REIT 
industry (Highfield et al., 2021). The observed evidence 
of diseconomies of scale in this industry comes from cost 
function specifications from the late 1990s or early 2000s 
(Ambrose et al., 2000, 2005; Anderson et al., 2002; Miller 
et  al., 2006) and cost, revenue or profit function speci-
fications between 2000 and 2015 (Highfield et al., 2021) 
and is not inconsistent with a negative sum in the annual 
changes in ROE during the New REIT Era. A closer look 
reveals that the surviving REITs exert cumulatively a posi-
tive “within” effect and a negative “between” effects. En-
tering firms are the main source of the negative sum in 
the changes of ROE during this REIT era. This observa-
tion makes some sense since the entry barriers and being 
potentially less experienced in the industry are likely to 
bump up these REITs’ cost structures.
An examination of the results for the REIT Maturity 
Era after removing the GFC’s effects shows a positive sum 
in the annual changes in ROE. The “within” effect drives 
this result by itself. The cumulatively negative “between” 
and the “entry” effects counter the “within” effect during 
this period. Our annual and cumulative results for the 
REIT Maturity Era hint that improvements in the indus-
try’s economic efficiency may have occurred. These results, 
however, appear not to be driven by firm size or concen-
tration in the industry and are overall consistent with the 
findings in Highfield et al. (2021). These points resonate 
well with the Bennet decomposition approach and suggest 
another research avenue in the scale economies literature.
REITs are interesting and increasingly more important 
to the financial markets. Our paper demonstrates that the 
REIT industry is no less!
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